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PRORATING ADC SHELTER ALLOWANCES: PRESUMPTION Or
CONTRIBUTION BY NONRECIPIENT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff, who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children'
(AFDC) for her child, shared a residence with her incapacitated sis-
ter. During a two-and-one-half month period when plaintiff's sister re-
ceived no assistance benefits,2 plaintiff's AFDC shelter allowance was
prorated and correspondingly reduced, as required by a New York
public welfare regulation.4  After an adverse ruling in a hearing5 be-
fore the state welfare agency, plaintiff initiated a class action in federal
district court, arguing that the regulation violated the implementing reg-
ulations of the Social Security Act by effecting a conclusive presumption
of income.6  The court found for the plaintiff.7  Upon appeal by the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970).
2. Prior to January 1, 1973, plaintiffs sister received benefits under the New York
Home Relief program, N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw §§ 157-65 (MeKinney 1966), a state-
funded and state-administered general assistance program. In mid-March 1973, she be-
gan receiving assistance under the Aid to the Disabled Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55
(1970).
3. Plaintiffs rent was $180, toward which her sister made no contribution. Before
January 1, 1973, plaintiff's shelter allowance portion of her AFDC grant was $155 a
month, the maximum permitted to a household of three persons. This amount was re-
duced to $110 a month, i.e. two-thirds of $155, while plaintiff's sister received no as-
sistance; it was increased to $155 when the sister became eligible for Aid to the Dis-
abled. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208, 1213 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974) (No. 5054).
4. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.30(d) (1974):
A non-legally responsible relative or unrelated person in the household, who
is not applying for nor receiving public assistance shall not be included in the
budget and shall be deemed to be a lodger or boarding lodger. The
amount which the lodger or boarding lodger pays shall be verified and
treated as income to the family. For the lodger, the amount in excess
of $15 per month shall be considered as income; for such boarding lodg-
ers, the amount in excess of $60 per month shall be considered as income. In
the event a lodger does not contribute at least $15 per month, the family's shel-
ter allowance including fuel for heating, shall be a pro rata share of the regular
shelter allowance.
5. An AFDC applicant or recipient may request and receive a hearing before the
state welfare agency regarding questions of fact involved in agency actions affecting his
assistance claim, including its reduction or termination. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1973), im-
plementing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). New York's fair hearing regula-
tion is found at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358.1-.27 (1974).
6. Plaintiff's statutory argument was based upon 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973):
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A State plan under title IV-A of the Social Security Act must provide that the
determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care
by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or men-
tal incapacity of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such cases) the unem-
ployment of his father, will be made only in relation to the child's natural or
adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent who is ceremonially
married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to sup-
port the child under State law of general applicability which requires steppar-
eats to support stepchildren to the same extend [sic] that natural or adoptive
parents are required to support their children. Under this requirement, the in-
clusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a "substitute parent" or
"man-in-the-house" or any individual other than one described in this para-
graph is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming
the availability of income by the State. In establishing financial eligibility and
the amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is actually
available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income
only of the parent described in the first sentence of this paragraph will be con-
sidered available for children in the household in the absence of proof of ac-
tual contributions.
In addition to her statutory argument, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.30(d) (1974) on three grounds: (1) that the regulation created a
conclusive presumption offensive to due process; (2) that it denied her equal protection
of the laws; and (3) that it impinged on her rights to free association and privacy. Brief
for Appellees at 3-4, Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974).
7. Taylor v. Lavine, No. 73-C-699 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 23, 1973). The district court
in Taylor adopted the reasoning of the court in Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), on the presumption issue. Hurley involved 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31
(a) (3) (1973), quoted in Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186, 188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), and 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 150, 150-51 n.2 (1974):
When a female applicant or recipient is living with a man to whom she is
not married, other than on an occasional or transient basis, his available in-
come and resources shall be applied in accordance with the following:
(iv) When the man is unwilling to assume responsibility for the woman
or her children, and there are no children of which he is the acknowledged
or adjudicated father, he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with sec-
tion 352.30(c).
The Hurley court noted that the cross-reference in the regulation should be to § 352.30
(d). 365 F. Supp. at 188 n.1. During the four months in 1970 and 1971 that plaintiff
Hurley lived with an unrelated male friend, the shelter allowance she received for herself
and her three children was reduced from $150 to $115. After a fair hearing, it was
set at $120, i.e. four-fifths of $150. Ms. Hurley appealed to federal district court, where
her due process claim (similar to that of plaintiff Taylor, note 6 supra) was found to
have sufficient merit to give the court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970),
thus permitting it to hear the statutory claim under the theory of pendent jurisdiction.
The court held that the New York regulations were inconsistent with 45 C.F.R. § 233.90
(a) (1973), quoted in note 6 supra, inasmuch as they impermissibly assumed that the
lodger would pay his portion of the shelter costs. 365 F. Supp. at 195.
The Taylor case had a second plaintiff, Ms. Otey, who received AFDC for herself
and her son. They had received a maximum shelter allowance for two persons of $145.
When an older, ineligible, and unemployed son entered the household, the allowance was
reduced to $96.65, two-thirds of $145.00. No explanation was given in the Taylor opin-
ion for the difference in budgeting procedure between the Otey and Taylor households,
both of which contained three members. See note 3 supra.
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defendant New York Commissioner of Social Services, 8 the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: The setting of AFDC benefit
levels by prorating the shelter expenses on the basis of an ineligible
person's presence in the recipient's household does not constitute a con-
clusive presumption of contribution by that personY
The public welfare provisions of the Social Security Act of 193510
were designed as a "scheme of cooperative federalism"'1 to meet the
needs of victims of the Depression who would not benefit from other
relief programs12 or the eventual economic recovery of the nation.1
AFDC is one of four categorical public welfare programs'4 created un-
8. The Taylor appeal was consolidated with that from Hurley v. Van Lare, 365
F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
9. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974) (No. 5054). The court specifically avoided the issue of the
possible mootness of plaintiff Taylor's claim since her benefits had been restored. Id.
at 1213 n.3. The court also remanded the case for the convening of a three-judge court
to consider the constitutional issues raised by appellees. See note 6 supra. The remand
was heard by a panel consisting of District Judges Bauman and Weinstein, who decided
the Hurley and Taylor cases respectively, and Circuit Judge Hays, who wrote the major-
ity opinion in the instant case. In a 2-1 decision, the majority found that the New York
regulations established an irrebuttable presumption of support by the lodger, which was
offensive to due process. The three-judge court also said that it did not have to decide
whether the claims were moot since the case was a class action involving a regulation
that affected many AFDC families. Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (S. &
E.D.N.Y. 1974).
Plaintiffs have been granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the stat-
utory issues. Taylor v. Lavine, 43 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1974) (No. 5054).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970, Supp. I, 1973).
11. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968). The Court was speaking only of
AFDC, but the phrase could be used to describe all the original public welfare provi-
sions of the Act. See note 14 infra. In simplified terms, the federal government pro-
vides the major portion of the funding on a matching basis to the states, which admin-
ister the programs. States are not required to participate, but if they choose to do so,
they must submit plans to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the
Secretary's approval.
12. E.g., the Work Projects Administration (WPA), the Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC), and the Public Works Administration (PWA). See generally King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968); W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHDREN (1965); F.
PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGuLATNG THE POOR (1971).
13. The public welfare programs, and particularly AFDC, were a federal response
to the failure of rudimentary state welfare programs under the pressures of the Depres-
sion. Mothers' pension programs existed in forty-six states, but by the early 1930's were
unable to meet the massive needs of dependent children. Lurie, Major Changes in the
Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 825, 826-27 (1974).
14. The four categorical programs were (1) AFDC, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970,
Supp. HII, 1973); (2) Old Age Assistance (OAA), id. §§ 301-04, 306; (3) Aid to the
Blind (AB), id. §§ 1201-04, 1206; and (4) Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled
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der the Act and is intended to meet the financial needs of dependent
children. 15 An applicant for AFDC must satisfy two basic eligibility
requirements: 1 (1) dependency, defined by the Federal Act to mean
(ATPD), id. § 1351-55. ATPD was not added to the Act until 1950. OAA, AB, and
ATPD were repealed, effective January 1, 1974, and replaced by Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. H§ 1381-85 (Supp. I, 1973), a uniform, guaranteed annual
income program for the disabled, blind, and elderly.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). "Dependent child" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)
(1970) as follows:
[A] needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental
incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, un-
cle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place or residence maintained by
one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A)
under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as deter-
mined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary)
a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly at-
tending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for
gainful employment ....
The Court in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), devoted a significant portion of its
opinion to the legislative history of the AFDC program. It found that the "paramount
goal" of AFDC was the protection of the child deprived of the support of a "breadwin-
ner." Intact families could be expected to benefit from other public programs and pri-
vate employment. Id. at 325-29.
16. This is an often repeated statement, see, e.g., Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761,
764 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970), but is no longer entirely
accurate. The Supreme Court's decision in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in
effect sustained New York's practice of conditioning initial and continuing eligibility on
home visits by the recipient's caseworker. Similarly, in New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the Court held that the state could condition
eligibility on participation in a state work-training program.
These two cases appear to be contrary to a line of analysis developed by the Court
for evaluating state-imposed eligibility conditions unrelated to need. That line began
with King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), which invalidated Alabama's "substitute par-
ent" condition, and continued through Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (Illi-
nois provided assistance to children aged 18 to 21 in vocational school, but not to those
in college). In Swank the Court said "a state eligibility standard that excludes persons
eligible for assistance under the federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act
." Id. at 286. In Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972), in which California
had attempted to say that parents away from home on active military service were not
absent from the home, the Court clearly stated that eligibility "must -be measured by
federal standards." Id. at 600.
The Court also eliminated durational residence requirements for eligibility in Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), on constitutional rather than statutory grounds.
Following the King-Townsend-Remillard line, lower courts have struck down a com-
mon eligibility condition that an applicant or recipient mother provide the state with the
name of the putative father of her child and/or cooperate in legal action to obtain his
payment of child support. See, e.g., Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973),
prob. furs, noted sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 415 U.S. 912 (1974); Story v. Roberts, 352https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/6
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the physical deprivation of parental support;17 and (2) economic need,
as determined by the states in their standards of need.'"
The amount of a recipient's allowance is calculated by measuring his
income19 and resources20 against his need.2 ' Often, when other facts
F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem.
sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D.
Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970). But see 38 Fed. Reg. 10940
(1973) (adoption of HEW regulation permitting states to deny mother's portion of
AFDC grant, while continuing payments to her for the child, when she fails to cooperate
in seeking support from putative father).
Finally, it can be argued that the Court's decision in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972), has the effect of permitting the states to manipulate eligibility by altering
their standards of need. See Note, What Remains of Federal AFDC Standards After
Jefferson v. Hackney?, 48 IND. L.J. 281 (1973).
17. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
18. Prior to 1947, recipients' needs were determined by caseworkers on a case-by-
case measuring of expenditures. Since 1947, states have had to develop standards which
specify by household size the income required to pay for basic subsistence needs. Shel-
ter needs and special needs (e.g., special diet for diabetics) are usually calculated sep-
arately and added to the recipient's basic needs as established by the standard. Lurie,
supra note 13, at 840. Shelter needs can be the amounts actually paid, a set maximum
regardless of household size, or varying maximums depending on family size-the case
in New York. HEW regulations require that the standard be uniformly applied through-
out the state, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(iii) (1973), and that certain items of need be
included in the standard, id. § 233.20(a)(2)(iv). See BURAU OF FAMILY SER VICES,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SIMPLIFIED METHODS FOR DETER-
MINING NEEDS (1964), reprinted in 2 CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW,
MATERIALS ON WELFARE LAW at VI-8.
In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968), the Court, citing U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
pt. IV, § 3120 (1957), stated that "each State is free to set its own standard of need
and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program."
Every major Supreme Court public welfare case since King has reaffirmed that state-
ment. E.g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 541 (1972).
In 1968 Congress amended the Act to add § 402(a)(23), which required the states
to bring their standards into line with the increased cost of living. Act of Jan. 2, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 213(b), 81 Stat. 898 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)
(1970)). When the Supreme Court first confronted this requirement and its ambiguous
legislative history in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), it found that, while the
amendment required the states to increase their standards, they did not have to increase
the level of benefits paid to recipients. Then, in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972), the Court found permissible a Texas practice of making a percentage reduction
in the updated standard of need when calculating the amount of a recipient's award. For
a full explanation of this process see Note, supra note 16. The net effect of Rosado
and Jefferson is that the states have virtually unlimited latitude in setting their level of
benefits and standards of need as applied to the determination of the recipients' grants.
19. Income is described by 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973) and 45
C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973) as "such net income as is actually available for current use
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are present, states have presumed, without later verification, that an ap-
plicant has available resources or income.22 Beginning with King v.
Smith2 s and Lewis v. Martin,2 4 court decisions 25 and Department of
on a regular basis .... " Newer proposed regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 18254 (1973),
specify only "net income available for current use." The earlier version, however, was
applicable in Taylor.
20. Resources are described in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (i) (1973):
In addition to the home, personal effects, automobile and income producing
property allowed by the agency, the amount of real and personal property, in-
cluding liquid assets, that can be reserved for each individual recipient shall
not be in excess of two thousand dollars.
A more recent proposed regulation states that the value of the resources an AFDC recip-
ient family may reserve, other than its home, heirlooms, wedding and engagement rings,
and materials used in employment,
shall not be in excess of a market value of $2250, of which not more than
$1200 shall consist of motor vehicles; the real and personal property shall be
valued at their gross market value including encumbrances.
38 Fed. Reg. 18254 (1973).
Another interpretation of "resource" was suggested by the court in Randall v. Gold-
mark, 495 F.2d 356, 361 (1st Cir. 1974), which said in dictum:
[We believe that to qualify as a currently available resource .. it need only
be shown that [it] . . . directly benefit[s] an AFDC recipient in such a manner
that [it is] actually used to defray expenses which such recipient would other-
wise incur.
21. If there is a budgetary deficit between needs and income, the state may elect
to fill all or part of it. Some states impose a maximum for a family of a given size
regardless of the magnitude of its deficit. This procedure was sustained by the Supreme
Court in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), against statutory and constitu-
tional attacks. Other states pay a fixed percentage of the budgetary deficit. Still others
follow Texas, see note 18 supra, in applying a percentage reduction to the standard of
need to decrease benefit levels. Lurie, supra note 13, at 838-39.
22. This practice would seem to be supported by 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970):
A state plan for aid and services to needy families with children must...
in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources
of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or
of any other individual (living in the same house as such child and relative)
whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need
of the child or relative claiming such aid, as well as any expenses reasonably
attributable to the earning of any such income ....
The court in Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.), af!'d mene., 396 U.S.
5 (1969), construed the term "other individual," which was added by amendment in
1968, to include only persons classified as "Essential Persons," a category long-recog-
nized by HEW as incorporating only persons essential to the well-being of the child.
Moreover, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(vi)(b) (1973) states that the choice of who is
an "Essential Person" rests with the recipient, not the state. Since Solman, no state has
successfully argued that § 602(a) (7) permits a presumption of income. For examples
of the presumptions states have used, see note 25 infra.
23. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). King involved an Alabama regulation that classified an
unrelated male living with an AFDC recipient as a "substitute parent," and thereby dis-
qualified the recipient from receiving AFDC since the children were deemed not to be
deprived of parental support. The case turned on the definition of parent. After re-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/6
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Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regulations26 have prohibited
viewing the legislative history, see note 15 supra, the Court said that parent meant "only
those persons with a legal duty of support." 392 U.S. at 327. In a footnote, the court
sated that the predecessor regulations of today's 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (ii) (1973),
limiting income to that "actually available for current use on a regular basis," "clearly
comported" with § 602(a) (7). 392 U.S. at 319 n.16. Taken with the Court's definition
of parent, this footnote plainly suggested that no presumption of support or contribution
of income could be made in the absence of a legal obligation that it be provided.
24. 397 U.S. 552 (1970). After King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), HEW pro-
mulgated 45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969), which was the predecessor of today's 45 C.F.R.
I 233.90(a) (1973), quoted in note 6 supra, prohibiting the presumption of contribution
by persons other than natural or adoptive parents, or stepparents obliged to support their
stepchildren under a state law of "general applicability." At issue in Lewis was a Cal-
ifornia statute, CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE §§ 11351-11351.5 (West 1969), requiring
a "man assuming the role of a spouse" (MARS) to contribute toward the household's
needs and assuming that a stepfather made such a contribution. The Court found that
45 C.F.R. § 203.1 (1969) comported with the federal statute, since HEW could "reason-
ably conclude that an obligation to support under state law must be of 'general applica-
bility' to make that obligation in reality a solid assumption on which estimates of funds
actually available to children on a regular basis may be calculated." 397 U.S. at 558-
59.
25. The presumptions of income or support that have been held impermissible fall
into three general categories. First, a number of courts have struck down presumptions
that apply a stepfather's income to the recipient's needs. See, e.g., Rosen v. Hursh, 464
F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972); Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.), affd
mem., 409 U.S. 1070 (1972); X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970), aff'd
sub nom. Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971); Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990
(N.D. Ind.), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 922 (1970); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409
(D. Conn.), afj'd mem., 396 U.S. 5 (1969); Uhrovick v. Lavine, 43 App. Div. 2d 481,
352 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1974); In re Slochowsky, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 342 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup.
Ct. 1973); In re Fowler, 130 Vt. 176, 288 A.2d 463 (1972); Borkman v. Commissioner
of Social Welfare, 128 Vt. 561, 268 A.2d 790 (1970). But see Sugarman v. Burns, 76
Misc. 2d 813, 350 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Faro. Ct. 1973). For an example of a valid state sup-
port law of general applicability, see Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., - Iowa -
197 N.W.2d 192, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813 (1972).
The second kind of presumption that has been held invalid is attribution to the fam-
ily's needs of the income of a child or other legally nonobligated relative. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973); Reyna
v. Vowell, 470 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972); Howard v. Madigan, 363 F. Supp. 351 (D.S.D.
1973); Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587 (W.D.N.C. 1971), a!fd mem., 409 U.S. 807
(1972); Bourque v. Commissioner of Welfare, 6 Conn. C.C.R. 685, 308 A.2d 543
(1972); Howard v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 272 A.2d 676 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971);
Montgomery v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., - Iowa -, 209 N.W.2d 30 (1972); HEW
State Letter No. 1088 (Sept. 25, 1970), reprinted in 2 CENTER ON SocrAL WELFARE POL-
ICY AND LAW, MATERIALS ON WELFARE LAW at VI-135.
Finally, courts have held impermissible the presumption that the income of an unre-
lated person in the recipient's household is available for the recipient's needs. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Roselli
v. Affleck, 373 F. Supp. 36 (D.R.I. 1974); Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289 (W.D.
Pa. 1969); cases cited note 30 infra (prorating shelter allowance).
26. See note 6 supra.
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such presumptions, unless the income or resources are derived from a
legal support obligation of general applicability, such as that imposed
upon natural or adoptive parents. All other income must be "actually
available for current use on a regular basis '28 before it can be applied
to the recipient's budgeted need; similarly, resources must be "cur-
rently available."29
In Taylor v. Lavine, the court determined that presumptions of re-
duced need justified prorating the shelter allowance. 0 In reaching its
27. Presumptions based on state statutes that have attempted to place a support obli-
gation upon only those stepfathers whose children receive AFDC have been held imper-
missible. The courts have reasoned that a stepfather support law that would permit a
presumption of income under 45 C.F.R. § 230.90(a) (1973) would have to obligate all
stepfathers in the state to support their stepchildren to the same extent as natural and
adoptive children are supported. See, e.g., Gaither v. Sterrett, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D.
Ind.), aft d mem., 409 U.S. 1070 (1972); Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., - Iowa
-, 197 N.W.2d 192, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813 (1972). A similar argument
would apply to the case of the unrelated person in the household.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973); see note 19 supra.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (3) (i) (1973); see note 20 supra.
30. Several other recent cases have dealt with state regulations prorating the shelter
allowance. In Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp.
298 (N.D. Ind. 1973), an Indiana regulation, as applied, was found to create an irre-
buttable presumption foreclosing an "objective and equitable" determination of need.
The court said it did not have to decide whether the presumption set up an impermissi-
ble assumption of available income. Id. at 305. The court in Owens v. Parham, 350
F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972), held the prorating of the shelter item invalid as applied
because the practice presumed contribution by ineligible persons without providing the
recipient a chance for rebuttal. A Massachusetts regulation that conclusively presumed
that a stepfather provided shelter for his recipient stepchildren was held to be contrary
to 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973) and offensive to due process. Boucher v. Minter, 349
F. Supp. 1240 (D. Mass. 1972). In Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Pa.
1969), Pennsylvania was found to have violated federal regulations by assuming that le-
gally nonobligated adults paid a share of recipient children's shelter allowance.
The California Supreme Court invalidated a state regulation which assumed non-
needy relatives provided shelter as "gifts" to recipient children. Waits v. Swoap, 11 Cal.
3d 887, 524 P.2d 117, 115 Cal. Rptr. 21, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 499 (1974). The court
ruled that the presumption did not comport with the state welfare statute and was con-
trary to the King and Lewis decisions. In Hausman v. Department of Institutions &
Agencies, 64 NJ. 202, 314 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974), the court held
that the state could not prorate shelter and basic needs and thereby reduce the grant
unless it verified the contribution of the ineligible household member. In Battle v. La-
vine, - App. Div. 2d -, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1974), the court found that the prorating
of the shelter allowance where a recipient lived with a friend assumed the latter's sup-
port and thus violated 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973).
Three cases have reached the same result as Taylor. In Dullea v. Ott, 316 F. Supp.
1273 (D. Mass. 1970), the court in dictum stated that the assumption that noneligible
persons and recipients in the same household shared expenses was realistic and not a
deprivation of due process. The court in Watson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 6 Pa.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/6
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decision, the majority noted that the New York regulation 3' was the
state's attempt to keep ineligible persons from receiving benefits indi-
rectly in the form of free living space provided by a recipient.32 The
majority reasoned that the state may achieve this goal by making the
level of benefits dependent upon the presence or absence of an ineligi-
ble person in the household, as long as that criterion accurately mea-
sures the recipient's needs. 3  The presence of an ineligible person in
the household indicated, to the court, the recipient's reduced need for
space. 4 In addition, the presence of an ineligible person evidenced
the recipient's reduced need for rent expenditures as a result of the
lowered per capita shelter costs and the benefits of economies of scale
accruing to the enlarged household.35  The court concluded, therefore,
Cmwlth. 54, 293 A.2d 133 (1972), held that the prorating of shelter expenses did not
presume any contribution by the nonrecipient; the court cited its own dictum in Cuffee
v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 503, 291 A.2d 549 (1972), as the only
precedent for its argument. In Cuffee, the court had said in dictum that prorating did
not assume any contribution and that the practice protected the welfare department from
paying the rent of nonrecipients. See also Padilla v. Wyman, 34 N.Y.2d 36, 312 N.E.2d
148, 356 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1974), appeal filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3087 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1974) (No.
69) (prorating of basic needs reflected lowered per capita costs and involved no assump-
tion of contribution or support).
31. See note 4 supra.
32. 497 F.2d at 1216.
33. Id. at 1215. The court said that King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), see note
23 supra, permits a regulation like New York's as long as it determines need accurately
and does not attempt to "vindicate a moral interest unrelated to the need of the family
.. 497 F.2d at 1214-15.
34. The court stated that New York may infer "from the presence of the lodger in
the household that the AFDC-recipient family actually needs less space for its own use
than it is paying rent for." 497 F.2d at 1215.
35. Id. at 1216. The economies of scale argument appears to have entered welfare
cases in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), where the Court suggested that
Maryland's maximum grant scheme which set a $250 maximum on any family's award
(meaning that families with over six members received less per capita than smaller fam-
ilies) could be justified by the "greater ability of large families-because of the inherent
economies of scale-to accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments."
Id. at 479-80. Other courts have considered or used the same argument. See, e.g.,
Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298, 303 (N.D.
Ind. 1973); Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 207-08,
314 A.2d 362, 365, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
Most states implicitly recognize the functioning of economies of scale in their stand-
ards of need. Cf. Montgomery v. Iowa Dep't of Social Servs., - Iowa -, -, 209 N.W.
2d 30, 31 (1973). For example, a hypothetical state might say that one person needs
$150 a month; two persons, $275; three, $375; and four, $450. The issue raised by cases
like Taylor is whether the needs of a family of three living with an ineligible person
are $375.00 or ($450/4) > 3 = $337.50.
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that a recipient's actual housing costs are accurately measured by pro-
rating shelter expenses, that is, by distributing the real costs equally
among household members and then deducting the ineligible person's
share.3 6 Moreover, the court asserted that prorating does not presume
that the ineligible person is contributing his share of housing expenses,
because his needs and those of the recipient are separable.3 7
In dissent, Judge Oakes argued that living space is a resource and
must be measured in actuality.3 8 He also contended that the majority's
presumption of a reduced need for space 9 might, in some cases, be
contrary to fact40 and thereby violate an HEW regulation 1 requiring
that the recipient's need be determined on an "objective and equitable
basis."42 In addition, economies of scale and actual cost reductions in
shelter expenses could not occur in the absence of a contribution by
the ineligible person. HEW regulations, 43 however, prohibit presump-
tions of such contribution. 44  Finally, Judge Oakes relied upon three
similar cases45 to suggest that a presumption of contribution or reduced
36. 497 F.2d at 1215-16.
37. Id. at 1215. The court did not explain how the needs of the ineligible persons
could be separated from those of the recipient after they presumably have been consid-
ered together in order to take advantage of economies of scale.
38. Id. at 1219. Judge Oakes cited Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974), Lewis
v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1970), and 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.90(a) (1973), as support for the proposition that resources, '"be they income or
amount of living space," must be determined by factual verification rather than presump-
tion. 497 F.2d at 1220.
39. 497 F.2d at 1219. Judge Oakes noted that the state never argued the reduced
need hypothesis; he suggested that the majority simply invented it. Id.
40. Id. For example, the presence of a "lodger" may result in the crowding of liv-
ing and sleeping quarters. Id.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973) requires that state plans for AFDC
[pirovide that the determination of need and amount of assistance for all ap-
plicants and recipients will be made on an objective and equitable basis and
all types of income will be taken into consideration in the same way, except
where otherwise specifically authorized by Federal statute.
42. 497 F.2d at 1220. Judge Oakes also pointed out that plaintiffs' shelter allow-
ance would be increased to its maximum if the lodger moved out. This result does not
follow logically if the presence of the lodger demonstrates a reduced need for space. Id.
at 1219 n.8.
43. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973); see note 6 supra.
44. 497 F.2d at 1222.
45. Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298
(N.D. Ind. 1973); Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Hausman v.
Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 NJ. 202, 314 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 417 U.S.
955 (1974); see note 30 supra. Judge Oakes also relied upon Shea v. Vialpando, 416
U.S. 251 (1974), for his proposition. In Shea, Colorado had set a maximum allowance
for work expenses for AFDC recipients. The Court found the Colorado practice in-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/6
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need for space might be permissible, but only if the recipient were af-
forded an opportunity for rebuttal. 46
The majority correctly acknowledged4 7 that conclusive presumptions
of contribution or income are not permitted by HEW regulations48 and
case law.49 In effect, however, the Taylor court proceeded to permit
valid under federal regulations and case law requiring that need be measured on an indi-
vidual basis. In the interests of administrative efficiency, a state might apply a prede-
termined level of work expenses to all recipients' budgets, so long as the individuals
whose expenses exceeded that set level were provided an opportunity to prove their posi-
tion and receive individualized consideration. Id. at 265.
46. 497 F.2d at 1219.
47. Id. at 1215.
48. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973); see note 6 supra.
49. See cases cited notes 23-25 supra. For cases dealing with presumptions of con-
tribution to shelter expenses, see note 30 supra. These cases all reflect the statutory
arguments commonly used in welfare law cases.
Although the Taylor court was not confronted with constitutional issues, see notes 6
& 9 supra, conclusive presumptions that impinge upon protected areas of property inter-
ests and individual freedom have been found violative of procedural due process. In an
early case, Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), the Supreme Court held that the
fifth amendment due process clause was violated by a conclusive presumption that a
transfer of property within two years prior to death was in contemplation of death, and
hence taxable. In recent years the Court has found due process problems with other
conclusive presumptions. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(school board cannot require all pregnant teachers to take maternity leave beginning in
fifth month of term on basis of presumption of physical incapacity; physical condition
must be determined on individual basis to satisfy due process requirements); United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (denial of foodstamps to
households in which member had been claimed as tax dependent in prior year by person
not in household was not rational measure of need and was based upon irrebuttable pre-
sumption, often contrary to fact, that household member was being supported); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (state could not use irrebuttable presumption of non-
residence to foreclose student's presentation of evidence that he was resident if presump-
tion was not "necessarily or universally true in fact"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (unmarried fathers cannot be conclusively presumed unfit to care for their chil-
dren upon death of mother). In Vlandis, the Court suggested a test of irrebuttable pre-
sumptions: the presumption must fail as offensive to due process if (1) it is "not nec-
essarily or universally true in fact," and (2) the state has "reasonable alternative means
of making the crucial determination." 412 U.S. at 452. The first part of this test was
reaffirmed in LaFleur. 414 U.S. at 646. See generally Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions
as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173
(1974).
No Supreme Court case has ruled on the constitutionality of irrebuttable presumptions
in public welfare; the Court has always been able to use statutory analysis where income
or resources are the subject of the presumptions. See cases cited notes 23 & 24 supra.
Should the issue of the constitutionality of irrebuttable presumptions in public welfare
cases come before the Court, the welfare agency would probably argue that recipients'
need and welfare benefits are not individual or property interests protected by the due
process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendment. The decision in United StatesWashington University Open Scholarship
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conclusive presumptions of reduced need. "
Assuming arguendo that some presumption of reduced need is per-
missible, 51 an HEW regulation 2 requires that need be determined ob-
jectively and equitably. As the Taylor dissent suggested, the majority's
presumption often may not reflect reality. 3 For example, there may
not be a reduced need for space; rather, crowding may occur when an
ineligible person enters the household. Hence, the presumption does
not determine the recipient's need objectively."r Furthermore, since
the presumption is conclusive and does not permit rebuttal by the recip-
ient, it is arguably inequitable within the meaning of the regulation.
The majority's second presumption, derivative of the first, was that
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, supra, would, however, substantially weaken such a con-
tention.
50. One argument might be hypothesized in support of the court's presumption of
need, although the court did not make it. The state could argue that its action involved
merely its recognized freedom to set the level of need. See note 18 supra. While this
argument has some merit, it implies that a state may have two standards of need, one
for mixed households and another for households containing only recipients. 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a) (2)(i) (1973) (emphasis added) speaks specifically of "a statewide stand-
ard [of need]," and 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(iii) (1973) (emphasis added) requires
that "the standard . . . be uniformly applied throughout the State." In addition, 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973), quoted in note 41 supra, requires that individual need
be determined on an objective and equitable basis. A separate standard for mixed house-
holds that did not look to the fact of contribution would be incapable of providing an
objective and equitable determination of need. Cf. Hausman v. Department of Institu-
tions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 208-09, 314 A.2d 362, 365, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955
(19.74).
51. But cf. note 62 infra and accompanying text.
52. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(1) (1973), quoted in note 41 supra.
53. 497 F.2d at 1219.
54. There has been very little judicial interpretation of the meaning of "objective
and equitable" in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973). The court in Mothers & Childrens
Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1973), said of the
phrase: "[A]t least its minimum requirement is clear, namely, state programs must be
consistent and compatible with the goals and priorities of the federal statute and regula-
tions." Id. at 303. These goals, according to the court, are the protection of the needy,
dependent child and the preservation of the family unit. Id. The Stanton court pro-
ceeded to find that an Indiana regulation, similar to the one in Taylor, though objective
and equitable on its face, did not, when applied as an irrebuttable presumption, permit
an objective and equitable determination of need. Id. at 304-05. The court did not
reach the presumption-of-income issue.
In Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362,
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974), the court said that the state could not adjust its stand-
ard of need "by arbitrary means" amounting to a determination of need that was not
objective or equitable as required by 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973). Id. at 208-09,
314 A.2d at 366. The regulation and facts in Hausman were quite similar to those in
Taylor.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/6
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lowered per capita costs and economies of scale reduce the recipient's
actual needs for shelter.-l Considered purely as a conclusive presump-
tion of need, it must fail for the reasons set forth in the preceding para-
graph. While the majority emphasized the element of need, the
second presumption nonetheless has the effect of a presumption of in-
come. Real housing costs56 would be reduced and economies of scale
would function to the advantage of the recipient only when the ineligi-
ble person actually contributed his share. Since the "lodger" is not le-
gally obligated to contribute, HEW regulations57 prohibit any presump-
tion, however indirect, that he does. Only his actual, available contri-
butions toward his portion of the shelter need could be considered in
computing and reducing the recipient's grant.5
The dissent was generally correct in its analysis of the nature and
failings of the majority's presumptions of need. The dissent's sugges-
tion, however, that space is a resource subject to the objective and equi-
table requirements of the HEW regulation59 is not strongly supported
by case law"° or other regulations.6' More importantly, the implication
that a rebuttable presumption would be permissible is questionable in-
sofar as it directly, or in effect, assumes a contribution by the ineligible
person. As stated earlier, an HEW regulation prohibits any presump-
tion where there is no generally applicable legal support obligation.6"
55. Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298
(N.D. Ind. 1973), Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972), and Hausman
v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 417
U.S. 955 (1974), all suggest that the state may be able to assume from the presence
of an ineligible person in the household that the recipient has reduced shelter costs. All
three cases, however, say the presumption as applied must be rebuttable in order to be
constitutional (Owens) or objective and equitable (Stanton and Hausman).
56. The majority's focus on per capita costs is misleading. Statistically, per capita
costs would decline with the enlargement of the household. Such an arithmetic exercise,
however, does not reflect the real costs, and hence the need, of the recipient, unless the
ineligible person makes an actual contribution.
57. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973).
58. Id. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (describing income); id. § 233.90(a); see cases cited
note 25 supra.
59. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973), quoted in note 41 supra.
60. No supporting precedent has been found for the assertion that space is a re-
source. The definition used by the court in Randall v. Goldmark, 495 F.2d 356 (1st
Cir. 1974), see note 20 supra, suggested that a resource should have the capacity of be-
ing exchanged for goods and services. Such is not commonly the case with living space.
61. See note 20 supra.
62. This argument admittedly finds no precedent in case law. The issue of whether
a rebuttable presumption would conflict with 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973) apparently
has not been litigated. The cases cited in note 55 supra do suggest that some courts
Vol. 1974:763]
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By focusing its arguments on need rather than income, the majority
was able to avoid consideration of the weight of contrary precedent on
the specific issue63 and on presumptions of income in general.04 As
suggested above, however, the distinction between presumptions of
need and presumptions of income is highly tenuous. Even if some dis-
tinction were possible, it is perhaps analytically more useful to classify
both as budgetary presumptions, 5 because both impinge upon the bud-
getary process of determining the individual recipient's needs and re-
sulting award. Such budgetary presumptions are, at the very least, lim-
ited by the objective and equitable requirement of the HEW regula-
tion66 and by due process constraints on conclusivity.1' In most cases,
however, any budgetary presumption should fail qua presumption
where it directly or indirectly effects an assumption of contribution or
income.68 Conceivably a budgetary presumption might stand where it
does not have such an effect and where it permits an objective and
equitable determination of need.6 9 The New York regulation ° at is-
sue in Taylor, however, fails to satisfy any of these constraints on bud-
getary presumptions.
The arguments and decision of the Taylor court do not exist in the
world of legal abstraction alone; they have an immediate impact upon
look favorably on rebuttable presumptions; the cases should not be mad, however, as
precedent on the specific point raised here. See also Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614,
617 (D. Minn. 1970) (dictum) (ninety-day waiting period to establish "continued ab-
sence" of parent as precondition to eligibility for AFDC would be permissible as "re-
buttable evidentiary guide").
Clearly, a rebuttable presumption would not have the constitutional infirmities of an
irrebuttable presumption. See note 49 supra. A rebuttable presumption is constitution-
ally sound when there exists a "rational connection between the fact proved and the ulti-
mate fact presumed, and. . . the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not
be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Tur-
nipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). In the Taylor situation, them may arguably be a ra-
tional connection between the presence of a "lodger" and lowered shelter costs for the
recipient. Nonetheless, the strong language of the Court in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970), see note 24 supra, suggests that a rebuttable presumption, though constitu-
tional, would still conflict with the regulatory prohibition of assumption of income.
63. See note 30 supra.
64. See note 25 supra.
65. This term is suggested in Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated
to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1219 (1970).
66. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (1) (1973); see notes 41 & 54 supra.
67. See note 49 supra.
68. See notes 25 & 30 supra.
69. Cf. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974); notes 45 & 49 supra.
70. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.30(d) (1974).
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the lives of thousands of recipients. At the simplest level, these fam-
ilies will be forced to choose between excluding a nonrecipient family
member or suffering increased deprivation should they decide to keep
the family intact.71 This result is clearly contrary to the stated policy
of the AFDC program to "strengthen family life," 72 and it ignores exist-
ing judicial recognition of the "brutal need" of recipients.7 More gen-
erally, the court's decision may open the way to other, more restrictive
and manipulative 74 state and local regulatory actions contrary to the
purposes of the program. 5 Sound legal and social policy analyses of
the Taylor opinion by other courts, however, would help restrain such
undesirable results.
71. Perhaps the oldest and most telling criticism of the AFDC program has been
that its eligibility requirements often force the splitting up of a family. An unemployed
but able-bodied spouse can "desert" the family, knowing that they, at least, will receive
some assistance. States now have the option of providing assistance to intact families
with an unemployed spouse, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970), but not all states have implemented
it.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
73. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
74. F. PIVEN & R. CLWoD, RIEGULATING THE POOR (1971) gives an account of
governmental manipulation of the poor through the recurrent expansion and contraction
of the public welfare programs.
75. Recipients' litigation against state policy is often time-consuming; barring an
early injunction against implementation of a restrictive regulation, states may realize sig-
nificant savings in expenditures during the years prior to a final judicial resolution of
the issues.
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